Structural Racism in the United States: A Report to the U.N. Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the occasion of its review of the Periodic Report of the United States of America by Menendian, Stephen et al.
  
 
 
 
 
Structural Racism in the United States 
 
A Report to the  
U.N. Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination  
on the occasion of its review of the  
 
Periodic Report of the United States of America 
 
 
February 2008 
 
 
 
 
Prepared by: 
 
Stephen Menendian, Marguerite Spencer, Lidija Knuth, john powell, Sara Jackson, Fran 
Fajana, Andrew Grant-Thomas, Jason Reece, Eva Paterson, and Kimberly Rapp. 
 Structural Racism 
2 
I. Executive Summary 
 
As a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 1 
the United States is under an obligation to condemn and pursue a policy of eliminating 
racial discrimination, in all its forms (art. 2, ¶1).   The U.S. has not taken seriously the 
duty under Article 2 of CERD to affirmatively address racial discrimination.  Instead, the 
U.S. has rationalized racial discriminatory effects as not covered by U.S. law.  Sometimes 
these effects are caused by explicit government polices.  At other times they are caused 
by private actors.  Frequently, it is a combination of both.    
 
The Convention defines racial discrimination (art. 1, ¶1) to mean distinctions, exclusions, 
restrictions or preferences based on race which have “the purpose or effect” of nullifying 
or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in any field of public life.  CERD’s definition of 
discrimination is unequivocal: effects and racially disparate outcomes caused by 
individual action or government practices or policies, singularly or collectively, are of 
primary concern.  
 
Contrary to CERD, U.S. law defines racial discrimination more narrowly in at least two 
critical respects.  First, with few exceptions U.S. law narrowly defines cognizable racial 
discrimination by requiring evidence of intent to discriminate. Section II demonstrates 
that such a requirement is contrary to the framework of CERD and does not reflect the 
real-world operation of discriminatory behavior in contemporary American society.   As 
recognized by CERD, discrimination can be the product of facially race neutral polices 
and practices as well as unintentional action and inaction of individuals.  This observation 
is not controversial and yet fails to be robustly recognized in U.S. law.  
 
Second, U.S. law fails to recognize that racial discrimination in American society often 
arises from the interactions, both public and private, over time and across domains.  
Section III details how racial discrimination manifests itself in these ways and argues that 
to correct for unjustifiable and cumulative racial impacts, U.S. courts and policy makers 
must adopt an inter-institutional perspective.  Although Article 1 and General 
Recommendation XIV of CERD are concerned with racially disparate effects of policies 
and practices involving this intersectionality, U.S. courts have been increasingly reluctant 
to redress discrimination in one domain that is caused by interactions in other domains.  
The definition of discrimination under CERD also extends to private as well as public 
action. Although the U.S. has reserved to the Convention with respect to the regulation of 
private conduct beyond what is required under domestic law, the United States is 
responsible for addressing unjustifiable racial impacts that result from the interaction of 
public and private actions.   
 
                                                
1 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 1(1), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 216 (entered into force 
Jan. 4, 1969; adopted by the United States November 20, 1994) [hereinafter CERD]. 
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Section IV of the report outlines the duty of all U.S. Government authorities to act in 
conformity with and to take affirmative measures to meet the requirements under CERD 
(art.2).  Although the U.S. complies with laws that satisfy many of CERD’s mandates, it 
is increasingly backing away from affirmative measures to remedy racialized outcomes 
two ways.   
 
First, compliance with Article 2 requires the United States to pursue by all appropriate 
means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination.   Decision-making 
authority, however, is highly fragmented in the United States, which has important 
implications for racial equity.  Institutional actors are often unable to disrupt racialized 
outcomes that stem from policies across domains.  Well-intentioned institutional actors in 
one domain, such as education, can work at cross-purposes with actors in another 
domain, such as criminal justice, exacerbating conditions for communities of color.  
Furthermore, without formal coordination, various government authorities are less 
effective in preventing and responding to racialized disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita. Therefore, Article 2 requires that the United States enhance coordination among 
federal branches of government and state and local governing bodies. 
 
Second, although the Committee emphasized that the adoption of special measures in 
cases of persistent disparities are an obligation of the state,2 the U.S. has attempted to 
rationalize policy-based discrimination as resulting from conditions beyond its control, 
either private decision making or courts interpreting U.S. laws.3  For example, the U.S. 
federal government most recently argued for, and the Supreme Court ruled in favor of, 
the elimination of race-conscious student assignment policies in elementary and 
secondary education, despite a finding that the government had a compelling interest in 
addressing racial isolation.4  The Court not only failed to remedy the harmful effects of 
racial discrimination, it severely limited the capacity of other governmental entities to 
voluntarily address them.  By adopting this “color-blind” approach, both the executive 
and judicial branches of government exacerbate the effects of discriminatory practices 
and policies, thwarting integration efforts of local governing bodies in violation of  
Article 2. 
                                                
2 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination: United States of America, A/56/18, ¶ 399, 14/08/2001.   
3 Under U.S law, courts not only apply law, but also play a role in interpreting law both 
as a matter of the judicial function and as a matter of judicial review. See Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  Judicial review is the power of a court to review 
laws for their Constitutionality.   Although Congress may reverse or overturn judicial 
interpretation of a statute, the U.S. Supreme Court has the final authority to interpret the 
Constitution itself.   See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1071 (1991) for an instance in which the Congress modified some of the basic procedural 
and substantive rights provided by federal law in employment discrimination cases in 
response to a series of Supreme Court decisions that limited the rights of employees who 
had sued their employers for discrimination. 
4 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 
(2007). 
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Subsequent sections of this report draw attention to the many discrete areas in which the 
U.S. is failing to uphold its obligations under the Treaty.   This section emphasizes the 
need to bring U.S. law in alignment with framework envisioned in CERD in order to 
effectively address racial discrimination and promote and sustain genuine multi-racial, 
multi-ethnic integration. 
 
II. The “intent doctrine” in U.S. anti-discrimination law is inconsistent with the 
CERD framework.    
 
The U.S. legal standard requiring that victims of discrimination prove “intent” to 
discriminate as a condition to getting a remedy is a major barrier to addressing racial 
inequality in general and meeting CERD obligations in particular.   Such a requirement is 
contrary to the framework of CERD and does not reflect the real-world operation of 
discriminatory behavior in contemporary American society.  As recognized by CERD, 
discrimination can be the product of facially race neutral polices and practices as well as 
an unintended consequence of individual action.   
 
Racial discrimination is often the unintentional, but predictable consequence of public or 
private action.    
 
The Convention defines racial discrimination (Art. 1, ¶1) to mean distinctions, 
exclusions, restrictions or preferences based on race which have “the purpose or effect” 
of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in any field of public life.  Although the CERD 
definition recognizes purposeful discrimination, racially disparate outcomes and effects 
are of equal concern.5  Contrary to CERD, plaintiffs alleging racial discrimination in U.S. 
courts must prove that the defendant was motivated by racial animus, and that this 
discriminatory intent was the cause of plaintiff’s harm.   
 
It is not that the text of pertinent Constitutional or statutory provisions preclude a reading 
that accounts for unjustifiable racial impacts.6  Instead, U.S. courts have increasingly 
interpreted these provisions narrowly, especially with respect to racial discrimination.  In 
1976, the U.S Supreme Court, reviewing an Equal Protection Clause claim, limited the 
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against discrimination by announcing 
the “intent doctrine.”7  Under this doctrine, a plaintiff who alleges discrimination in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause must prove that the discriminating actor or 
agency “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ 
                                                
5 As defined in Article 1 and General Recommendation XIV, racial discrimination 
includes distinctions and exclusions that have an “unjustifiable disparate impact” upon 
the rights of freedoms of particular racial or ethnic groups. 
6 See the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Constitution XIV, §1:  “No state… shall deny to 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”    
7
 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  
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not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable racial group.”8  This 
requirement of intent to discriminate in spite of predictable, adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group is inconsistent with the paradigm envisioned in CERD and effectively 
bars most discrimination plaintiffs from pursuing Equal Protection claims. 
 
The Government’s report alleges that “statistical proof of racial disparity, particularly 
when combined with other circumstantial evidence, is probative of the discriminatory 
intent necessary to make out a[n equal protection] claim.”9  Thus, the report seems to 
suggest that the intent doctrine is not a substantial bar to bringing discrimination claims. 
 
However, relevant case law suggests that under the Equal Protection Clause, an 
unjustifiable disparate impact is clearly insufficient to establish racial discrimination.   If 
a discriminatory zoning decision, for example, is made at a city council meeting where 
residents made explicitly racist comments, the decision is still presumed to be non-racist, 
unless plaintiffs could prove discriminatory intent on the part of the council members.10   
The sole intent of the city council may well have been to stabilize property values, and as 
such, with the intent of excluding poor residents from the community, they deliberately 
choose not to rezone the property.  Even if the council likely associated poverty with 
blacks, such a predictable adverse outcome on a racial group is insufficient under U.S. 
law to establish a claim of racial discrimination.   
 
One of the most significant and tragic applications of this doctrine is highlighted by a 
landmark study filed with the United States Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp.11 The 
study showed that prosecutors seek the death penalty in 70 percent of cases involving 
Black defendants and White victims, yet only in 19 percent of cases involving White 
defendants and Black victims.  Further, White victim cases are 11 times more likely to 
result in death sentences than Black victim cases.  Despite this evidence, the Supreme 
Court held that the state's capital sentencing process was not administered in a racially 
discriminatory manner in violation of the Equal Protection Clause because a mere 
correlation between the racial characteristics and the application of the death penalty did 
not prove that the application of the death penalty to the McCleskey was motivated by 
racial prejudice.     
 
The intent doctrine makes incorrect assumptions about how people behave and make 
decisions.   
 
This constricted “intent doctrine” permeates U.S. antidiscrimination law, ignores much of 
what we know about the dynamics of discrimination, and deprives many of redress for 
discrimination. The extraordinarily high burden almost requires a civil rights plaintiff to 
find a “smoking gun” statement expressing outward racial animus.  Aside from the 
obvious problems inherent in requiring a private plaintiff to offer proof of a government 
                                                
8 Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)  
9 U.S. 2007 CERD Report, ¶ 319  
10 See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).  
11 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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actor or agency’s unspoken motivations, the futility of the intent doctrine stems from a 
fundamental misconception about how discrimination operates. Although social 
psychologists of the mid-twentieth century believed discrimination resulted from the 
discriminator’s conscious motivation (“intent”), modern social science has greatly 
expanded our understanding of discrimination and how it infiltrates interpersonal, 
intergroup, and structural relationships.12   
 
In recent years, social science research has shown that we all have subconscious or 
implicit biases—beliefs, attitudes, and expectations that are based on stereotypes about 
the race, gender, age, or other group to which an individual belongs. Though most of us 
are completely unaware of their influence on our subconscious, these biases affect how 
we perceive, interpret, and understand others’ actions.13 Because these attitudes—
unrecognized on the conscious level but powerful at the subconscious level—influence 
choices and decisions, individual and institutional discrimination can occur even in the 
absence of blatant prejudice, ill will, or animus.   
 
To demonstrate and analyze this process, psychologists developed the “implicit 
association test,” which measures unconscious attitudes toward various groups of people 
by tracking the response time required to match up pleasant and unpleasant words such as 
“love,” “kindness,” “trust” and “fear,” “hatred,” “dishonor,” respectively, with images of 
individuals who belong to “in-groups” and “out-groups”—Caucasians juxtaposed against 
African Americans or males juxtaposed against females, for example.14 More than two-
thirds of test takers register bias toward stigmatized groups.15 
 
Most recently, a 2005 study compared the relationship between employers’ explicit or 
conscious attitudes toward hiring members of a certain group and the employers’ actual 
hiring practices.16 The employers said they were equally likely to hire ex-offenders and 
non-offenders and equally likely that they would hire white and Black ex-offenders. 
However, in practice, the employers were unlikely to hire white ex-offenders, and even 
                                                
12 Eric K. Yamamoto, et al., Redefining Discrimination: Using Social Cognition Theory 
to Challenge the Faulty Assumptions of the “Intent Doctrine” in Anti-Discrimination 
Law (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Equal Justice Society).  See also 
Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987). 
13 Because of these implicit biases, identical actions or opinions of two people of 
different social groups often are interpreted differently, depending upon the group to 
which each belongs.  See also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1161 (1995). 
14 James L. Outtz, Implicit (Unconscious) Bias, (February, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Equal Justice Society). The test is available at 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit. 
15 Anthony Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations 
94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006). 
16 Devah Pager & Lincoln Quillan, Walking the Talk? What Employers Say Versus What 
They Do, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 355 (2005). 
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less likely to hire Black ex-offenders. Though it is possible that the subjects of the study 
intentionally inflated their “non-discriminatory” scores on the surveys, it is more likely 
that the subjects neither wanted nor intended to discriminate and yet, when faced with a 
real-world decision, acted in a discriminatory manner. 
 
These are just samples from a voluminous body of literature in which researchers grapple 
with the implications of unconscious bias and its meaning for discrimination law.17 Taken 
together, the studies show that the intent doctrine’s requirement that a plaintiff prove the 
discriminating actor or agency’s motivations creates an insurmountable barrier. It turns 
out that biased decision-making may result not from discriminatory motivation, as current 
legal models presume, but from a variety of unintentional categorization-related 
judgment errors that characterize normal human cognitive functioning.18   
 
Courts have most sharply drawn the intent requirement in the area of race.   Unlike race 
discrimination, courts have recognized the unconscious application of stereotypes in the 
age discrimination context.  “Age discrimination is not the same as the insidious 
discrimination based on race or creed prejudices and bigotry. Those discriminations result 
in nonemployment because of feelings about a person entirely unrelated to his ability to 
do a job. This is hardly a problem for the older jobseeker. Discrimination arises for him 
because of assumptions that are made about the effects of age on performance.”19 Courts 
have interpreted language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act20 identical to 
language in Title VII's section 703(a) 21 as requiring only that age have “made a 
                                                
17
 See also John F. Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami & Samuel L. Gaertner, Implicit and 
Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62 
(2002) (discussing how implicit and explicit racial attitudes and assumptions predict 
behavior); Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and 
Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES.143 (2004) (compilation of research 
demonstrating biased behavior in employment situations). 
18 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach 
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1995). 
19 Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting 113 
Cong. Rec. 34,742 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Burke)). 
20 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. s 623(a) (1988), provides in 
pertinent part: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer -- 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual's age. 
21 Section 703, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: “(a) It shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer - 
     (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 
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difference” or “played a part” in a decision-making process.22  In contrast, under the 
“disparate treatment” standard for Title VII cases, a plaintiff must prove that the 
discriminator was motivated at least in part by an intent to discriminate.23  As discussed 
earlier, the bar for equal protection cases is even higher.  If, as research shows, even the 
discriminating actor is not consciously aware of the underlying motivations, how can a 
third party possibly prove the actor’s intent? As long as the intent doctrine remains a 
central tenet of Equal Protection jurisprudence, all but the most overt discrimination will 
be left largely unchallenged.   
 
III. Racial discrimination in American society often arises from interactions, both 
public and private, across domains and must be corrected under CERD.   
  
The United States is responsible for failing to address unjustifiable racial impacts that 
result from the influence of public conduct on private decision-making.   
 
The definition of discrimination under CERD extends to private as well as public 
distinctions and exclusions that have the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
enjoyment of human rights or fundamental freedoms (art. 1, ¶1)  The States Party has a 
duty to prohibit and eliminate all forms of discrimination (art. 2, ¶1).  Although the U.S. 
has reserved to the Convention with respect to the regulation of private conduct beyond 
that which is required under domestic U.S. law, that is not a license to ignore the role of 
local, state, and federal government complicity in contributing to racial discrimination.  
Article 2, ¶1(c) extends the CERD prohibition to laws or regulations that perpetuate racial 
discrimination.   Increasingly, policies, institutions, and private decision-making are 
interactive. The decisions of private individuals are often responsive to institutional 
arrangements and public policies in ways that perpetuate discrimination.  To fulfill its 
obligations under CERD, the U.S. cannot hide behind the claim of private action where 
government has been or remains implicated. 
 
The development of the segregated housing market provides an example of the influence 
of public actions on private decision-making.  Residential racial segregation in the U.S. 
was systematically promoted by federal programs such as the Home Owners Loan 
Corporation and the Federal Housing Authority (FHA), which insured private sector 
loans.  From 1938 through the end of the 1950s, the FHA insured mortgages on nearly 
one-third of all new housing produced annually in the United States.24  But the FHA’s 
Underwriting Manuals considered blacks’ ‘adverse influences’ on property values and 
                                                
22 See Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1568 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding 
that an inference of discrimination can be drawn absent direct evidence of discriminatory 
intent). 
23 International Brotherhood. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335, n.15 
(1977)  (“‘Disparate treatment’ such as is alleged in the present case is the most easily 
understood type of discrimination.”). 
24 Kevin Fox Gotham, Urban Space, Restrictive Covenants and the Origins of Racial 
Residential Segregation in a US City, 1900-50, 24 INT’L J. OF URB. AND REGIONAL RES. 
616, 625 (2000).   
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instructed personnel not to insure mortgages on homes unless they were in ‘racially 
homogenous’ white neighborhoods. Under its eligibility ranking system, the FHA 
actually refused to lend money to or underwrite loans for whites if they moved to areas 
where people of color lived.   
 
As private lenders adopted policies conforming to these guidelines, this system became 
part of the “free” market.   Although the FHA removed explicitly racist language from its 
manuals in the 1950s, private appraisal associations, real estate agents and firms, and 
banks continued to use such language through the 1970s.25  These practices, along with 
local control and overt discrimination, made it difficult, if not impossible for blacks to 
own homes.  The FHA also encouraged private residents to maintain restrictive covenants 
banning African Americans from certain neighborhoods. Some scholars have estimated 
that racially restrictive covenants were in place in more than half of all new subdivisions 
built in the United States until 1948, when the United States Supreme Court declared 
them unenforceable.26   
 
In their place, local governments began and continue to employ suburban housing and 
land use policies to promote larger lot development, sustain property values, depress the 
growth of suburban rental housing, and limit the influx of African American and Latino 
households.27  Despite acknowledging that such zoning decisions predictably “bear more 
heavily on racial minorities,” the U.S. Supreme Court has not found them in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause.28  The FHA continues to provide building and 
homeownership subsidies that draw whites out of central cities and channel capital into 
suburban housing construction.29  The Court on a number of occasions has even used the 
segregated housing market to justify segregation in other areas.30   
 
This combination of public and private racial discrimination has produced entrenched 
patterns of residential segregation and resources disparities that exist today.  Even after 
recognizing its discriminatory role, the federal government has done virtually nothing to 
disestablish what has been described as a hyper-segregated housing market.31  Indeed, the 
federal and state governments continue to promote segregation by concentrating low 
income housing in segregated areas through the Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
program (LIHTC), which has produced over one million units.  As of 2000, three-
quarters of the nation’s traditional assisted housing units, and 58 percent of its Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit units, were located in central cities, which were home to only 
                                                
25 Id. at 626.  
26 Id. at 616, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
27 Rolf Pendall, Local Land Use Regulations and the Chain of Exclusion, 66 J. AM. 
PLANNING ASS’N 125 (Spring 2000). 
28 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269-70. 
29 Gotham, supra note 24, at 617.   
30 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
31 See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); KENNETH T. JACKSON, 
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985).   
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37 percent of the nation’s metropolitan population.32  This program has not been 
successfully challenged in court because the federal government has not explicitly 
pursued it.33   
 
Housing practices have not only segregated people of color from opportunity, they have 
also produced a highly racialized pattern in wealth accumulation.34  Achieving home 
ownership through the thirty-year mortgage became the primary mechanism by which 
most families created wealth.35 Renters accumulate no equity, while homeowners almost 
always secure financial gains that exceed inflation.  For blacks, these missed 
opportunities at home ownership compounded over time.  In 2000, in spite of significant 
past efforts to reduce housing discrimination and important recent efforts to address 
mortgage discrimination and boost homeownership rates for people of color, non-
Hispanic white households enjoyed a median net worth of $79,400, eight times the net 
worth of Hispanic households and ten times the net worth of African American 
households.36  Even at similar levels of income, significant gaps remain.37   
 
Racial and economic segregation remains severe in most metropolitan regions in the U.S. 
and is exacerbated by fragmented local government policies.38 Unlike many countries 
that fund essential public services either by aggregating property taxes at the state or 
federal level, the U.S.  funds on a very local fragmented level, building on the 
segregation that is already in place.  Public infrastructure and basic services like 
transportation, education, public safety, and recreation are either funded or controlled 
largely at the local level.  For example, schools in the U.S. are organized into local school 
districts that are required to fund a substantial portion of the cost of education through 
local property tax revenues.  Because local district boundaries mirror municipal 
boundaries, the economic and racial segregation resulting from exclusionary land usage 
creates vast discrepancies in the resources that districts are able to generate through 
                                                
32 LANCE FREEMAN, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, SITING AFFORDABLE HOUSING: LOCATION 
AND NEIGHBORHOOD TRENDS OF LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE 1990’S (2004), 
http://www.brookings.edu/urban/publications/20040405_Freeman.htm 
33 Thompson v. HUD, 220 F.3d 241, (4th Cir. 2000). 
34 MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. OLIVER, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995).  
35 Home equity constitutes the bulk of household assets for all racial and ethnic groups. 
SHAWNA ORZECHOWSKI AND PETER SEPIELLA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NET WORTH AND 
ASSET OWNERSHIP OF HOUSEHOLDS:  1998 AND 2000, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 
P70-88, (MAY 2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p70-88.pdf.  
36 Id.   
37 THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: HOW WEALTH 
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 47-56 (2004).   
38 For more information regarding the nexus between fragmentation and segregation see 
john a. powell,  Sprawl, Fragmentation, and the Persistence of Racial Inequality: 
Limiting Civil Rights by Fragmenting Space,  in GREG SQUIRES, ED., URBAN SPRAWL: 
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY RESPONSES (2002).  
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property taxes.   As a consequence, the drawing of municipal boundaries has powerful 
implications for private decision-making.39  
 
Myron Orfield’s review of fiscal capacity in the 25 largest metropolitan areas in 1998 
revealed a significant tax-base inequality between jurisdictions. 40  Districts in areas that 
require the construction of expensive homes, which are also predominantly White 
districts, have significantly more revenue to dedicate to education than districts that allow 
for affordable housing, which tend to have large populations of color.  Consequently, 
residents of many large urban areas pay a spatial premium for the uneven distribution of 
opportunities and resources that typifies our metropolitan regions.41   
 
Despite the inequalities that result, the U.S. has failed to put an end to this discriminatory 
funding system and its negative impact on life opportunities.  In the landmark case, San 
Antonio v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that an educational funding system based 
on local property taxes that resulted in large disparities in per-pupil spending between 
predominantly White districts and predominantly Black and Latino districts did not 
violate the Constitution because plaintiffs in this case were unable to show that the 
funding disparities involved were the result of intentional racial discrimination. 42 
 
Historical and contemporary government policies and practices have incentivized private 
behavior resulting in unjustifiable racial impacts that deny educational opportunities and 
fair housing with implications for racial inequities in a number of other domains, 
including health care and criminal justice. The CERD Committee observed in General 
Recommendation 19 that racial segregation may be a product of government policies as 
well as the unintended by-product of the actions of private persons.   The U.S. cannot 
defend its actions on grounds of private conduct when its own policies spur private 
decision makers to act in predictable ways with clear racial effects.   As Justice Kennedy 
wrote, “the distinction between government and private action… can be amorphous both 
as a matter of historical fact and as a matter of present-day finding of fact.  Laws arise 
from culture and vice versa.   Neither can assign to the other all responsibility for 
persisting injustices.”43  In both instances, the U.S. is responsible for failing to address 
                                                
39 MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS:  A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND 
STABILITY (1998).  
40
  Id.  
41  MICHAEL A. STOLL, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, JOB SPRAWL AND THE SPATIAL 
MISMATCH BETWEEN BLACKS AND JOBS (2005).   
42.See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 14 (1973) (citing TEXAS 
RESEARCH LEAGUE, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE PROBLEMS IN TEXAS 9, 13 (Interim Report 
1972) (stating that Alamo Heights, because of its relative wealth, paid approximately 
$100 per pupil; Edgewood, on the other hand, paid only $8.46 per pupil)). 
43 Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2795.  See also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J.) (“In one sense of the term, vestiges of past segregation by state decree do 
remain in our society and in our schools.  Past wrongs to the black race, wrongs 
committed by the State and in its name, are a stubborn fact of history.   And stubborn 
facts of history linger and persist.”).    
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the unjustifiable racial impacts that flow from its policies and practices.  CERD requires 
the U.S. to review and nullify policies that continue to perpetuate racial discrimination.   
 
The United States must look at how racial discrimination manifests as a consequence of 
policies and practices in multiple domains. 
 
As defined in Article 1 and General Recommendation XIV, racial discrimination includes 
distinctions and exclusions that have an “unjustifiable disparate impact” upon the rights 
of freedoms of particular racial or ethnic groups.  The CERD is clearly concerned with 
effects and racially disparate outcomes when caused by policies or practices from 
multiple domains and not just the domain in question.  This approach at times has been 
recognized in U.S. law.  For example, the United States Supreme Court struck down a 
literacy test requirement for voter registration because of school segregation, recognizing 
that the schools’ condition created a discriminatory effect in the use of the test in 
voting.44   
 
In general, however, United States courts interpreting U.S. law have been increasingly 
reluctant to redress discrimination in one domain that is caused by interactions in other 
domains.  For example, in Wards Cove v. Atonio, the Supreme Court decided that the use 
of statistical evidence showing racially stratified work force would no longer be sufficient 
to raise a rebuttable inference of discrimination.45 The employees of the salmon cannery 
sued the company under Title VII’s prohibition against employment discrimination.46 
They presented statistical evidence that nonwhites were overrepresented in lower paid, 
unskilled cannery jobs and under-represented in higher paid, skilled, noncannery jobs.  
Employees were hired through an informal process and recruited by white supervisors 
through word of mouth.  Ruling against the employees, the Court held that plaintiffs 
alleging a disparate impact were required to show statistical disparity between the 
“qualified” applicants in the labor pool of the surrounding area and the numbers actually 
hired out of the group.47  By requiring an analysis of the labor market that controls for 
background characteristics and the educational preparation of workers, the Court ignored 
the discrimination in education, housing, and health markets that created a racially 
stratified labor pool in the first place.48  As the facts in the case record revealed, the 
salmon industry was completely segregated by residence and work environment which, 
Justice Stevens wrote in his dissent, resembled a plantation economy.49    
 
                                                
44 Galston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).   
45 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989).    
46 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -17 (1981).  
47 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 651. 
48  See Rebecca M. Blank, Tracing the Economic Impact of Cumulative Discrimination, 
Address at American Economic Association annual meeting (Jan. 2005) in AM. ECON. 
REV. PAPERS & PROC., May 2006.    
49 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661-662.   
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Racialized outcomes are often the product of cumulative effects of discrimination over 
time and across domains.50   For example, housing discrimination constrains many black 
and Hispanic youth to attend high-poverty schools.51  Children in these schools are much 
less likely than their affluent peers to attend college, and more likely to drop out of 
school or complete their education in a correctional facility.52 All three outcomes reduce 
the labor market options these young adults are likely to have, with grave implications for 
their chances to secure health and retirement benefits.53 It follows that in order to fully 
understand why so many elderly African Americans and Hispanics live at or below the 
poverty line, we not only must retrace their life-long relationship to the labor market, but 
also their relationship to the housing market, and to the educational, and criminal justices. 
 
Neighborhood conditions also directly affect African Americans’ physical and mental 
health.  Childhood obesity rates are high in low-income neighborhoods as fear of crime 
and the lack of playgrounds and parks in poor areas keeps children indoors.54  Health 
risks also abound.  Although African Americans represent only 12.7 % of the U.S. 
population, they account for 26 % of asthma deaths,55  the highest rate of any racial/ethnic 
group.56  This is outcome is predictable and largely the result of African Americans’ 
                                                
50  George C. Galster, A Cumulative Causation Model of the Underclass:  Implications 
for Urban Economic Development Policy in THE METROPOLIS IN BLACK AND WHITE:  
PLACE, POWER, AND POLARIZATION, 190 (G.C. Galster and E.W. Hill, eds., 1992);.and 
Jurgen Friedrichs et. al , George Galster, and Sako Musterd, Neighborhood Effects on 
Social Opportunities:  The European and American Research and Policy Context, 
HOUSING STUDIES, June 18, 2003, at 797; George Galster and Sean P. Killen, The 
Geography of Metropolitan Opportunity:  A Reconnaissance and Conceptual 
Framework, HOUSING POLICY DEBATE, June 1, 1995. at 7; Margery Austin Turner and 
Dolores Acevedo-Garcia, Why Housing Mobility?  The Research Evidence Today.  
PRRAC NEWSLETTER, January/February 2005. 
51 LISA ROBINSON & ANDREW GRANT-THOMAS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY, BARRIERS TO HOUSING - UACE, PLACE AND HOME:  A CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
METROPOLITAN OPPORTUNITY AGENDA (September 2004). 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/metro/barriers_housing.php 
52 JOHANNA WALD AND DANIEL J. LOSEN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY, DEFINING AND REDIRECTING A SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE (2003).,  
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/pipeline03/FramingPaper.pdf 
53 See GARY ORFIELD (ED.), DROPOUTS IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE GRADUATION 
RATE CRISIS (2004); and JOHANNA WALD, LOSEN, DANIEL .J. (EDS.), DECONSTRUCTING 
THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE (2003).  
54 PREVALENCE OF OVERWEIGHT AMONG CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS ,U. S. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS 2003-2004,  
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/06facts/obesity03_04.htm  
55 LUNG DISEASE DATA IN CULTURALLY DIVERSE COMMUNITIES: 2005, LUNG DISEASE 
DATA AT A GLANCE: ASTHMA (2005), http://www.lungusa.org. 
56 LUNG DISEASE DATA IN CULTURALLY DIVERSE COMMUNITIES (2005), 
http://www.lungusa.org/site/pp.asp?c=dvLUK9O0E&b=308858. 
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homes being close to toxic dumps, toxic flumes and other environment hazards.  
Segregation and unequal access to health care mean that racial minorities receive less and 
worse health care than whites do, exacerbating health disparities.57   
 
Educators agree that this lack of health well-being in turn depresses student academic 
performance and achievement.58  It would make little sense then to assert that 
discriminatory practices in health or housing should not be considered when looking at 
education.  But this is the current position of the Supreme Court.  Moreover, inequitable 
school systems and a youth control complex push kids out of school and into inadequate 
local job markets that deny families shelter and stability and incentivize an illicit 
economy.  Felon disenfranchisement then commonly reduces the political participation of 
marginalized racial groups.  Employment, health, wealth, crime and safety, delinquency 
and risky behavior, educational achievement, recreation and where one lives are all 
linked.59  
 
To correct for the interaction between these domains and their unjustifiable racial 
impacts, U.S. Courts and policy makers must adopt an inter-institutional perspective.   
There are a number of limited examples where the Court has acknowledged the 
importance of a more holistic approach that is sensitive to the interactions between 
domains.  For example, the Supreme Court noted that in determining if there was a voting 
                                                
57 David R. Williams and Chiquita Collins, Racial Residential Segregation: A 
Fundamental Cause of Racial Disparities in Health, 116 PUB. HEALTH REP. 404(2001). 
Specific health risks of segregated neighborhoods that the authors reference include: 
elevated risks of cause-specific and overall adult mortality, infant mortality and 
tuberculosis; elevated exposure to noxious pollutants and allergens; a lack of recreational 
facilities; higher cost, poorer quality groceries; and limited access to high quality medical 
care. 
58
 RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP (2004) and 
Richard L. Canfield, et. al., Intellectual Impairment in Children with Blood Lead 
Concentrations below 10 g per Deciliter, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1517 (2003). 
59 For examples of economic and employment impacts see Chengri Ding and Gerrit-Jan 
Knaap, Property Values in Inner-City Neighborhoods: The Effects of Homeownership, 
Housing Investment, and Economic Development, 13 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 701 
(2003). For examples of health, environmental justice and transportation impacts see 
Williams and Collins, supra note 57; Christopher R. Browning and Kathleen A. Cagney, 
Moving Beyond Poverty: Neighborhood Structure, Social Processes and Health, 44 J. 
HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV.552 (2003); Helen Epstein, Enough To Make You Sick?, 
N.Y.TIMES MAG.  Oct. 12, 2003, 74; I.H. Yen and G.A. Kaplan, Neighborhood Social 
Environment and Risk of Death:  Multilevel evidence from the Alameda County 
Study,149 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 898 (1999); Robert D. Bullard, Addressing Urban 
Transportation Equity in the United States, 31 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1138 (2004). For 
crime and violence reports see Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton 
Earls, Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multi-Level Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 
SCIENCE 918 (1997).   
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rights violation, there should be a look at the totality of the circumstances instead of 
looking at one factor in isolation.60  Unfortunately, this approach has not been extended 
to other areas, and more recent decision by the Court have suggested an inclination to 
take a narrow, singular approach.   
 
Policy makers must also be free to address unjustifiable racial impacts that accumulate 
across domains. 
 
It is not simply that U.S. courts have insufficiently accounted for the ways in which 
discrimination is caused in other domains.  Increasingly, they are constraining the 
freedom of other policymakers to intervene.  While condemning the segregation of public 
institutions in Brown v. Board of Education, 61 the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the 
importance of an integrated society.  Although subsequent court decisions drew back on 
the initial mandate of Brown, later drawing jurisdictional limitations on judicial authority 
to implement school integration,62 and shielding local efforts to prevent housing 
integration,63 the judiciary left no doubt that local, state, and national authorities could 
craft policies designed to foster societal integration and reduce racial discrimination.    
 
The Courts are now construing the harm of racial discrimination as the harm of being 
classified on the basis of race.   In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School Dist. No. 1,64 a case that involved the school districts of Seattle and Louisville, the 
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the harms of a segregated society and the consequences for 
equal opportunity while striking down locally drawn efforts to address patterns of racial 
isolation.  Previously, courts were placing limits on judicial authority to intervene, with 
the assumption that democratically elected policy makers were free to act.  Now the 
Courts are constraining the response of public decision makers by insisting on a narrow 
reading of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. Programs designed to benefit racially marginalized groups are being 
circumscribed or struck down as U.S. courts review these distinctions with the same 
scrutiny that they give to distinctions drawn with clear racial animus.65  In a sense, 
society is moving backwards.  The courts have recognized the importance and impact of 
integration since Brown, but now there is little that government is permitted to do about 
it.   
 
Schools have started to resegregate just as the courts have adopted a more stringent 
definition of discrimination after years of substantial progress.  More than five decades 
after Brown the nation’s public schools remain extremely segregated by race and class, 
                                                
60 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
61 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
62 Milliken, v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
63 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
64 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
65 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).  (The Court held that all 
racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must 
be analyzed by a reviewing court under a standard of "strict scrutiny.") 
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with most urban African American and many Hispanic students isolated from real 
educational opportunity in poor school districts.   
o A growing number of students of color are attending predominately non-white 
schools, that are under resourced and these schools are segregated by both 
race and class. Urban African American children remain concentrated in the 
poorest performing and most economically segregated school districts in the 
nation. Almost half of African American students in the U.S. attend a central 
city school district, compared to 17% of White students.66    
o Research measuring dissimilarity for metropolitan school districts in 2000 
found that African American/White dissimilarity in schools was .65.  Thus, 
nearly 2 out of 3 children would need to transfer schools to integrate the 
nation’s metropolitan school districts.  While neighborhood segregation 
declined slightly during the 1990’s, school segregation increased.67   
o The average African American child attends a school with a 65% student 
poverty rate, compared to 30% for the average White student’s school.   
Segregated high poverty schools are also failing many students of color. 
Students attending majority non-white schools have lower standardized test 
scores, far greater drop-out rates, and significantly lower college attendance 
rates, than do students from majority white schools. Three quarters of White 
students in ninth grade graduate on time while only half of African American 
students finish high school with a diploma in four years.68 
 
Although racial discrimination was indeed deliberate and intentional, today it is likely to 
be the result of policies and institutions that are no longer explicitly designed to 
discriminate. Yet the effects are cumulative and well known.  CERD requires the U.S. to 
address these negative, racialized consequences.  And while at times, the U.S. courts 
were more responsive them, recently the Court has been taking a narrow view of 
discrimination, which puts the U.S. out of step with CERD.   
 
IV. There is a duty of all U.S. government authority to affirmatively act in 
conformity with CERD.   
                                                
66 CHRISTOPHER SWANSON, EDUCATION POLICY CENTER, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, WHO 
GRADUATES? WHO DOESN’T A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL 
GRADUATION, CLASS OF 2001 (Feb. 25, 2004), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410934_WhoGraduates.pdf. 
67 JOHN LOGAN, LEWIS MUMFORD CENTER FOR COMPARATIVE URBAN AND REGIONAL 
SCHOOLS, 1990-2000, CHOOSING SEGREGATION: RACIAL IMBALANCE IN AMERICAN 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1990-2000 (March 29, 2002), 
http://mumford.albany.edu/census/SchoolPop/SPReport/page1.html 
68
 GARY ORFIELD ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE 
URBAN INSTITUTE, ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN OF NEW YORK & THE CIVIL SOCIETY 
INSTITUTE, LOSING OUR FUTURE: HOW MINORITY YOUTH ARE BEING LEFT BEHIND BY 
THE GRADUATION RATE CRISIS (March, 2004), 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/dropouts/dropouts04.php. 
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While many U.S. laws are consonant with its duties under CERD to prohibit racial 
discrimination, the CERD framework demands more than mere compliance with laws 
that happen to satisfy many of its mandates.  First, the CERD framework envisions an 
approach in which the State Party undertakes to affirmatively eliminate all practices of 
racial discrimination by ensuring that all public authorities and public institutions, 
national or local, act in conformity with this obligation (art. 2, ¶1(a)).  Secondly, the State 
Party also assumes full responsibility for reviewing governmental, national and local 
policies, and to amend, rescind, or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect 
of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination (art. 2, ¶1(c)).  Finally, each State Party 
is also required to introduce appropriate legislation to achieve these goals (art. 2, ¶1 (d)).   
Taken together, these articles require the U.S. to take affirmative measures to enhance 
coordination between federal branches and with state and local government bodies, in 
what can be a very fragmented system. 
 
This fragmentation of decision-making authority has important implications for racial 
equity.  First, institutional outcomes are shaped, often dramatically and inexorably, by 
inputs beyond the reach or control of particular institutional actors.  Well-intentioned 
government actors hoping to intervene and disrupt processes that perpetuate racial 
discrimination often lack authority to control institutions that play an influential role in 
shaping racial outcomes.  For example, racial and economic segregation of schools often 
stems from the fragmented policies and actions of multiple actors, including housing and 
planning authorities and education officials.  Strategies designed by federal courts or 
school boards intended to foster integration and remediate racial discrimination often 
falter because of this fragmentation. The myriad of inputs that shape neighborhood 
dynamics, including private decision-making, family resources, and government policies 
like the No Child Left Behind Act,69 do a great deal to shape educational outcomes, yet 
courts and schools exert little influence over any of them.   
 
Second, absent efforts at coordination, even well-intentioned actors can produce 
misaligned and therefore discriminatory policies and practices. Many minority males in 
large urban school systems enter a “school-to-prison-to-dropout pipeline” created by 
education and juvenile justice systems working at cross-purposes. On the one hand, 
resources that could support the neediest students and forestall their incarceration are 
used instead to enhance school security, raise test scores, and attend to administrative 
details. Reducing the number of incarcerated students is rarely a focus of school reform 
efforts.  On the other hand, contact with the juvenile justice system can doom struggling 
students to miss weeks or months of school; to receive inferior education while 
incarcerated; and, upon returning to public school, to try to catch up with coursework that 
may be unrelated to classes they took while detained. Few students who return to public 
schools manage to graduate.70 
                                                
69 Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 20 
U.S.C.).  
70 BALFANZ ET AL., NEIGHBORHOOD HIGH SCHOOLS AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
HOW NEITHER HELPS THE OTHER AND HOW THAT COULD CHANGE 81 (2003).  
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Third, the fragmentation of authority creates space for individual or institutional decision-
makers to both ignore the predictable consequence of their acts as well as to act on the 
basis of unscrupulous, possibly willfully racist motives.  Historically, “state’s rights” has 
been the cry of many concerned with protecting or promoting local white privilege 
against federal government interference. Today, many municipalities couple “restrictive 
land use regulations … with costly infrastructure requirements and difficult approval 
processes that make affordable home building impractical, if not impossible.”71 The wish 
to manage growth and preserve open space may be a factor in some instances, but “Not 
In My Back Yard” (NIMBY) concerns are often in play, for example, acting on the fear 
that an influx of low-income or minority neighbors would reduce neighborhood quality 
and property values.   
 
Fourth, a lack of formal and institutionalized coordination across domains can hinder an 
effective response.  The events of 9/11 highlighted how dispersed and uncoordinated 
government authority may be less effective in preventing and responding to negative 
outcomes. Similarly, the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita highlighted the danger 
of a lack of formal and institutionalized coordination across domains. The stark 
conditions that resulted in so many deaths and dislocations, as well as the tragically 
inadequate and delayed governmental response, were a consequence of fractured 
government and institutional authority, as well as of past overlapping governmental 
policies.  
 
In the first half of the twentieth century, New Orleans was a racially and culturally 
vibrant and heterogeneous city, despite its poverty. Until 1950, poverty was not 
geographically isolated and blacks and whites lived in close proximity in integrated 
communities.  That changed dramatically around 1970, when federal housing and 
transportation policies in the city reduced racial and economic integration, after which the 
poor became highly concentrated in hyper-segregated neighborhoods.  The number of 
concentrated-poverty neighborhoods in New Orleans actually grew by two-thirds 
between 1970 and 2000, even though the poverty rate stayed about the same (26–28 
percent).72  As a consequence, at the moment the levees broke, the Lower Ninth Ward 
was almost exclusively black.  Despite these conditions, the middle class-oriented 
evacuation plan, which assumed car ownership, did not account for the fact that most of 
the city’s poor black residents did not own vehicles.  The racialized disinvestment across 
domains in schools, public health, and other critical institutions in the core city had 
existed for decades in New Orleans, unlike the wind and the water, but were inadequately 
addressed due to the lack of coordinated governmental action. The natural disaster was 
really a man-made one. 
                                                
71 ROBINSON & ANDREW GRANT-THOMAS, supra note 51, at 38. 
72 CENSUSSCOPE, www.censusscope.org/us/rank_dissimilarity_white_black.html; ALAN 
BERUBE & BRUCE KATZ, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, KATRINA’S WINDOW: CONFRONTING 
CONCENTRATED POVERTY ACROSS AMERICA (2005). In fact, in 2000 New Orleans ranked 
twenty-ninth in the country based on black-white racial segregation and second among 
the fifty largest cities in the number of extreme-poverty neighborhoods. Id.  
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The obvious response to the splintering of decision-making authority is better alignment 
between the policies and practices of relevant institutions that would result in more 
racially just outcomes.  In the context of 9/11, as described in the U.S. Report, this deadly 
lack of coordination lead Congress to create “a new Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) in 2003. This Department combines a number of other departments, agencies, and 
portions of departments, such as the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security 
Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the former 
Immigration and Naturalization Service.”73   The DHS brought together these various 
government agencies to increase their institutional coordination and to more effectively 
protect the U.S.  The same must be done to remedy racial discrimination.   
 
The U.S. recognizes its responsibility under CERD to force institutional compliance from 
above.  It issued the understanding that despite the Constitutional division of 
jurisdictional authority, “to the extent that state and local governments exercise 
jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall, as necessary, take 
appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of this Convention.”74  The federal 
government is not without the tools to significantly influence decision making at the state 
or local level, although it has failed to yield them to comply with CERD.  In its 
concluding observations, the CERD Committee emphasized that “irrespective of the 
relationship between the federal authorities, on the one hand, and the States, which have 
extensive jurisdiction and legislative powers, on the other, with regard to its obligation 
under the Convention, the Federal Government has the responsibility to ensure its 
implementation on its entire territory.”75   
 
There are programs at every level of government designed to address racial 
discrimination in domains such as housing, education, health care, employment, 
transportation and so on.  However, these programs are not appropriately linked.   
Pursuant to CERD, the U.S. should implement a plan for providing oversight, review, 
coordination, and management of these policies so that they produce desired outcomes.   
These programs must be monitored to incorporate feedback, make adjustments and 
improvements to ensure that outcomes are achieved.    
 
As required by CERD, while laws and regulations in the U.S. are under continuous 
legislative and administrative revision and judicial review through processes arising 
under U.S. law and custom, contrary to U.S. assertion,76 the Government conducts these 
revisions and reviews in a manner that does not satisfy its duty to comply with the 
convention.  For example, the U.S. Report contends that legislative and executive branch 
actions are constantly being assessed by the judiciary for their consistency with the U.S. 
                                                
73 See U.S. 2007 CERD Report, ¶44.    
74 U.S. Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.  140 Cong. Rec. 14326 (1994). 
75 Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
: United States of America. 14/08/2001. A/56/18, ¶ 383.   
76 See U.S. 2007 CERD Report, ¶82. 
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Constitution and laws.77  However, the U.S. fails to point out that the judiciary also 
reviews the meaning of the Constitution itself.   If the judicial interpretation of anti-
discrimination measures and the Equal Protection is not coterminous with definitions 
under CERD, then this review process cannot be thought to satisfy CERD mandates.   
Furthermore, the decisions of U.S. Courts cannot be thought to operate independently 
from the influence of government and outside the framework of law.  They are no less 
subject to CERD mandates and the requirements of law than any other branch of 
government.   The judiciary is a state organ that is bound to binding international treaties. 
All branches of U.S. government are under a duty to act in conformity with CERD.    
 
The United States has experienced a long period of racial retrenchment.  By using narrow 
evidential rules, adopting a strict intent standard, shifting the burden of proof to the 
plaintiff, treating laws which discriminate against historically disadvantaged groups the 
same as laws intended to help racially disadvantage groups, and by the refusal to look at 
interactions across domains, the United States has increasingly been out of step with what 
we know about how discrimination operates as well as with the CERD framework.  The 
predictable result has been a steady weakening of anti-discrimination laws in 
incontrovertible conflict with CERD.    
 
V.  Recommendations 
 
UNDER ARTICLE 1 
• Retool the “intent doctrine.” 
o The Federal Government should amend all relevant anti-discrimination 
statutes, including Titles VI (housing) and VII (employment) to explicitly 
include cases in which plaintiffs can show disparate or discriminatory 
impacts.    Additionally, the Government should pass legislation that 
would account for cases that violate the CERD, but cannot currently be 
brought under the equal protection clause because of the existing “intent 
doctrine.” 
 
• Continue to support social science research on implicit bias and its 
implications for improved anti-discrimination legislation 
o The increasing judicial recognition of the existence and effects of 
unconscious bias, and the growing body of literature analyzing this 
phenomenon, provide guidance for litigation and legislation that will more 
effectively combat all types of discrimination.  The Federal Government 
should continue to fund this body of research, as well as hold hearings to 
educate current legislators and members of the judiciary about the realities 
of implicit bias, and its relevance for crafting more effective anti-
discrimination laws and policies. 
 
• Look to the laws of other countries and the international community 
                                                
77 Id. at (¶ 91). 
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o Requiring a showing of intent to prove discrimination appears to be 
somewhat of an American anomaly.  For instance, Canada and South 
Africa both rejected intent as an element of discrimination claims, finding 
that it acted as an insuperable barrier to victims seeking a remedy.  
Likewise, the European Union recently recognized that discrimination 
includes direct acts by someone knowingly discriminating against another, 
o as well as indirect acts not motivated by prejudice, but nevertheless 
resulting in discriminatory outcomes.  Additionally, international treaties 
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibit 
all forms of discrimination.  These laws and policies should inform future 
legislation and judicial opinions in the areas of racial and other 
discrimination. 
 
• Redress Indirect Discrimination 
o The Federal Government should amend all relevant anti-discrimination 
statutes, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § 
2000d et seq., to outlaw direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of 
race, color or national origin, and explicitly reach the actions of federal, 
state and private actors.  The primary purpose of the amended statutes 
shall be the eradication of social and economic inequities, especially those 
that are systemic in nature and deeply embedded in social structures, 
history, institutional practices and norms.  In interpreting the amended 
statutes, courts shall further the stated purpose through special measures, 
legal and otherwise, that advance the interests of historically 
disadvantaged individuals, communities and social groups who were 
disposed, deprived of their human dignity and who continue to endure 
social and economic disadvantages.  
 
• Address Disparities Across Domains and at Predictable Points of 
Institutional Interaction  
o The Federal government should affirmatively link housing, schools, 
employment, transportation, health care and other political and cultural 
opportunities.  We have government programs in every domain and at 
every level of government, but they are not coordinated.   
 Congress should reconsider reauthorization of HOPE VI, proposed 
in 2005, which would have linked the siting of affordable housing 
with a plan to improve public school conditions in the area.78   
                                                
78 Draft Reauthorization Bill for the Hope VI Program. Prepared by Senator Barbara 
Mikulski (D-MD). Introduced on July 27, 2005. The bill would have required that every 
HOPE VI grant recipient establish, in partnership with local schools and the school 
superintendent, a comprehensive education reform and achievement strategy to turn the 
school that serves the HOPE VI development into a high performing school.  The 
Department of Housing and Urban Development would have conducted site visits to 
HOPE VI applicants to assist in making funding decisions and requiring that Public 
Housing Authorities (PHA’s) set new performance benchmarks for each component of 
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o The Federal and State Governments should provide legislative support and 
incentives for metropolitan-wide governing bodies to affirmatively link 
housing, schools, jobs and transportation, creating communities of 
opportunity.   
 E.g., Jefferson County (Louisville) consolidated their city and 
suburban school districts after Milliken failed to link city and 
suburban school integration efforts.  It then consolidated the city 
and county governments in 2001. On a metropolitan-wide scale, 
the governing body linked housing and education by using Project-
based Section 8 funding to locate affordable housing units in areas 
students of color wanted to go to school, until the funding dried up.  
Schools were released from busing orders once the neighborhood 
was integrated. These efforts went on politically, even after the 
federal court order to desegregate was lifted.  
 
UNDER ARTICLE 2 
• Coordinate and Involve All Levels of Government 
o The Federal Government should determine how to coordinate institutional 
actions in situations in which authority is dispersed among many different 
levels of government and when concerted action could result in more 
racially just outcomes.   
o All levels of government should acknowledge and address racial 
discrimination that arises from the interaction of race-neutral 
governmental policies and private decision-making.   
o All levels of government should conduct studies and monitor progress not 
of single decision points, but of the cumulative effects of many decision 
points over time that affect the distribution of life opportunities. 
o E.g., To map out why so many elderly African Americans and Hispanics 
live at or below the poverty line, the government could retrace their life-
long relationship to the labor market, their relationship to the housing 
market, and to the educational and criminal justice systems. 
 
• Support affirmative measures. 
o The Federal Government should reverse the trend of reading the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment very narrowly to exclude race-
conscious measures to end discrimination and achieve integration. 
 It should seek to reverse the decision in Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 to allow for race-
                                                                                                                                            
their HOPE VI project, including benchmarks for linkages with schools, relocation of 
residents and achievement of self-sufficiency. Failure to meet benchmarks would have 
resulted in the Secretary imposing appropriate sanctions, such as the appointment of 
alternative administrators, imposition of financial penalties, or withdrawal of funding.  
For more information see http://mikulski.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=241669. For a 
summary of the reauthorization see http://www.clpha.org/page.cfm?pageID=729.   
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conscious student assignment plans in K-12 schools, at a minimum 
when other race-neutral policies have failed to integrate our 
schools.  When the next lawsuit is filed raising this issue, the 
Solicitor General should defend the rights of the school districts to 
adopt race-conscious measures, contrary to the position it defended 
in Parents.    
 It should recommit to the importance of achieving integration 
across domains in neighborhoods, schools, and places of 
employment and leisure. 
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